ETN-Code: WIWI029
Titel der Veranstaltung: Spieltheorie und strategisches Verhalten
Untertitel:
Art der Lehrveranstaltung: Vorlesung
Kreditpunkte: 3
Semester: WiSe 2021/22
Turnus: gemäß Curricula
Semesterwochenstunden: 2
Kursverantwortliche/r: Meyer Klaus Dietmar [1201200048]
Dozent/in: Cabau Noémie [1202100044]
Organisationseinheit: Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftstheorie
Ziele und Inhalt des Kurses: This course attempts to communicate the main ideas and central results of game theory. Minimal competence in mathematics is required: We will focus on the core structure of the theory, i.e., its assumptions and conclusions, without digging into the proofs, and we will highlight the deficiencies of and critics against the theory. The aim of the course is to provide with a critical introduction to game theory, and a guide to the literature.
Thema der einzelnen Lehreinheiten:
| Teim | Title | Literature |
| Chapter I: General Introduction to Game Theory 1. Conflict of interests 2. Historical Background 3. Examples of conflict of interests 4. A classification of decision making (individual vs group; under conditions of (a) certainty, (b) risk and (c) uncertainty) |
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| Chapter II: Extensive and Normal forms of a game 1. Game tree 2. Information sets 3. Outcomes and Payoffs 4. Examples: games of pure strategies 5. Extensive form 6. Rationality and Knowledge 7. Pure strategies and the normal form of a game |
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| Chapter III: Two-person zero-sum games 1. Introduction: strictly competitive vs non-strictly competitive games 2. Strictly competitive games with equilibria 3. Strictly competitive games without equilibria 4. The minimax Theorem 5. Exploitation of opponent’s weaknesses |
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| Chapter IV: Two-person Non-zero-sum non-cooperative games 1. Review of the salient aspects of zero-sum games 2. Examples: Prisoner’s dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes 3. Dominated and Equilibrium strategies 4. Finitely vs Infinitely Repeated prisoner’s dilemma 5. Existence of equilibria 6. Definition of solutions for non-cooperative games 7. The desirability of pre-play communication and contracting (optional) |
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| Chapter V: Two-person Cooperative games 1. The VnM solution 2. Arbitration schemes: fairness and equity of a bargaining solution 3. Nash’s bargaining problem 4. Criticism of Nash’s bargaining solution and alternative axiomatic approaches to the bargaining problem (optional) 5. A strategic approach to the bargaining problem: Rubinstein’s bargaining game (optional) |
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| Chapter VI: N-person non-cooperative games 1. Existence of Equilibrium points 2. Games with perfect information: simultaneous and dynamic games 3. Games with imperfect information: simultaneous and dynamic games 4. Spence’s signaling model (optional) |
Empfohlene Literatur (für die Gesamtveranstaltung):
Book chapters
• Games and Decisions: An Introduction and Critical Survey, R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa - Chapters 1 to 7.
• Microeconomic Theory, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green.
• Notes on the Theory of Choice, David Kreps. (Complementary reading)
Papers (optional readings)
• Job Market Signaling, Michael Spence, Quaterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3. (Aug., 1973), pp. 355-374.
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Ariel Rubinstein, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Jan., 1982), pp. 97-109.
• Other solutions to Nash’s bargaining problem, Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky, Econometrica, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May, 1975).
Sprache der Lehrveranstaltung: Englisch (eng)
Notenskala: Prüfung (fünfstufig)
Form und Umfang der Leistungskontrolle:
Prüfungsanmeldung: über das elektronische Studienverwaltungssystem
Anmerkungen:
